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ABSTRACT 
Research suggests that patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD) have an attentional 
bias toward socially threatening stimuli, and recent studies have shown that computerized 
interventions designed to train attention away from such stimuli decrease attentional bias 
and SAD symptomatology. The current study sought to replicate findings from previous 
attention retraining studies and to examine neural mechanisms underlying attentional 
biases in SAD using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Thirty-two SAD 
patients were randomized to complete either eight 15-minute sessions of a probe 
detection task designed to train attention away from disgust faces (n=16), or a placebo 
control task (n=16). Before and after these sessions, patients completed an fMRI probe 
detection task. Sixteen matched healthy controls also completed this fMRI task on one 
occasion. Study hypotheses were as follows: (a) post-intervention, SAD patients in the 
retraining condition would show greater reductions in attentional bias and SAD 
symptomatology compared to patients in the placebo condition; (b) SAD patients would 
show greater amygdala activation, and less prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation, when 
 iv 
viewing negative faces than healthy controls; and (c) post-intervention, SAD patients in 
the retraining condition would show less amygdala activation, and greater PFC 
activation, when viewing negative faces than patients in the placebo condition. Results 
showed no between-group differences in attentional bias or SAD symptomatology post-
intervention, with both groups showing significant symptom reduction. However, 
attentional bias change was significantly correlated with symptom change across the 
entire SAD sample (N=32) and was predictive of Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale scores 
at post-intervention.  Neuroimaging results showed hypo-activation in the orbitofrontal 
cortex and anterior cingulate cortex at pre-treatment for the SAD group compared to 
healthy controls. At post-treatment, this difference was no longer significant across the 
entire SAD group (N=32). Finally, results indicated that activation at pre-treatment in the 
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus was significantly correlated with symptom change 
across the entire SAD sample. These results suggest that SAD patients may not be 
engaging higher-level cortical regions as readily as healthy controls and add to the recent 
growing body of research suggesting that attention retraining may not be an effective 
treatment for patients with SAD. 
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Introduction 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is defined as a marked and persistent fear of 
negative evaluation in one or more social or performance situations (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). SAD has an estimated 6.8% prevalence rate among the 
general population and is the second most common anxiety disorder behind only specific 
phobia (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005). SAD is highly comorbid 
with other psychiatric conditions (Kessler et al., 2005), often has an early age of onset, 
and is characterized by a chronic, unremitting course if left untreated (Dewit, Ogborne, 
Offord, & MacDonald, 1999; Neal & Edelmann, 2003). The disorder results in significant 
distress and impairment, is associated with economic burden (Stein & Kean, 2000), and 
has a negative impact on educational attainment (Katzelnick & Greist, 2001) and overall 
quality of life (Saarni et al., 2007).  
Attentional Biases in SAD 
 Attentional bias is a term that refers to exhibiting preferential attention to specific 
types of stimuli in one’s environment, either internal or external (Harvey, Watkins, 
Mansell, & Shafran, 2004). Attentional biases have been proposed to contribute 
significantly to the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders, including SAD 
(Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Hofmann, 2007). A recent meta-
analysis of 172 studies confirmed that attentional biases towards threat are reliably linked 
with anxiety (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 
2007). Beck and colleagues (1985) postulated that anxiety disorders are uniquely 
associated with a bias in the initial stimulus registration phase of cognitive processing: 
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attention is rapidly and automatically deployed toward threatening information. Indeed, 
anxious individuals have been shown to exhibit vigilance towards threatening stimuli 
during the initial stages of processing (e.g., 16-500 ms post stimulus onset) (Bar-Haim et 
al, 2007). Although this shift toward threatening information is evolutionarily adaptive, it 
becomes problematic when it leads to hypervigilence, as is proposed to occur in anxiety 
disorders (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Beck’s content-specificity hypothesis stipulates that 
each emotional disorder can be characterized by cognitive content specific to that 
disorder (Beck, 1976; Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987). According to this 
theory, patients with SAD have distorted cognitions relative to social contexts and are 
hypersensitive to threatening information that is social in nature (e.g., critical faces) 
(Coles & Heimberg, 2005; Lundh & Öst, 1996). Empirical evidence supports this 
hypothesis and suggests that patients with SAD detect signals of social threat with greater 
speed and accuracy than healthy controls (Amir, Freshman, & Foa, 2002; Hope, Rapee, 
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, Bohn, & Bystritsky, 1996; 
Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). In addition to exhibiting a 
hypervigilence towards threat, it has also been shown that patients with SAD have 
difficulty disengaging from socially-threatening stimuli (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & 
Przeworski, 2003; Buckner, Maner, & Schmidt, 2010).   
Why Study Treatments that Manipulate Attentional Bias in SAD? 
Despite the high prevalence of SAD in the general population, only 20% of 
individuals with the disorder receive treatment (Coles, Turk, Jindra, & Heimberg, 2004), 
and of those individuals who do receive treatment, only 60% respond positively 
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(Liebowitz, Ninan, & Blanco, 2005). Meta-analyses show consistent results, with less 
than 60% of patients showing a significant response to treatment (e.g., Federoff & 
Taylor, 2001). In light of these findings and the significant room for improvement in 
outcomes, the importance of developing, evaluating, and understanding novel treatments 
for SAD cannot be overemphasized. One such novel treatment is attention retraining 
(also known as attention bias modification).  
Assessing and Manipulating Attention 
Attention retraining is an intervention that manipulates attentional biases by 
training participants to attend to certain types of stimuli by using visual probe detection 
tasks (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). The dot-probe is one such task and involves 
simultaneously presenting two stimuli that vary in emotional content (e.g., a threatening 
word and a neutral word) on a computer screen, removing the stimuli, and then replacing 
one of the stimuli with a probe. The participant is instructed to identify an aspect of the 
probe as quickly as possible. It is assumed that participants will be faster at detecting an 
aspect of a probe that replaces the stimulus to which the participant was attending before 
the probe appeared. Visual probe detection tasks were first used to assess attentional bias. 
For example, the faster a participant responded to a probe that replaced a threatening 
stimulus as compared to a probe that replaced a neutral stimulus, the greater the 
participant’s attentional bias towards threat.  
In recent years, visual probe detection tasks have also been used to manipulate 
attentional biases. In attention retraining paradigms, a strong contingency is built by 
pairing probes with either threatening or neutral stimuli, thereby changing attentional bias 
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over repeated trials. For anxious populations, this technique has recently gained 
popularity as a intervention – in these interventions, the probes consistently replace the 
neutral stimulus in neutral-threat stimuli pairs, thus training attention away from threat 
and towards neutral. Unlike psychotherapy, which seeks to alter cognitions on a 
conscious level, attention retraining interventions are believed to alter attentional biases 
on a more implicit level. Typically, participants are unaware of the contingency between 
the placement of probes and stimuli; therefore, the training is assumed to alter attentional 
processes not under volitional control (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012).  
Recently, attention retraining has gained increasing empirical support for its 
ability to effectively manipulate attention. For example, MacLeod and colleagues (2002) 
successfully manipulated attention in a non-clinical sample by training participants to 
attend to threatening words using a dot-probe task. In this experiment, one group of 
participants was trained to attend to threatening words (i.e., the probe always replaced the 
threat word) while the other group was trained to attend to neutral words (i.e., the probe 
always replaced the neutral word). Post-training, the participants in the threat group 
exhibited faster reaction times to probes replacing new threatening words. Additionally, 
at post-training those participants in the threat group reported higher levels of negative 
mood and anxiety during a stressful task than participants in the neutral group. This study 
provides support for the notion that there may be a causal relationship between 
attentional biases toward threat and a vulnerability to experience anxiety. 
There is increasing evidence that training patients with anxiety disorders, 
including SAD, to attend away from threat may decrease anxiety. Because increased 
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attention to social threat and difficulty disengaging from threat are believed to be 
involved in the etiology and maintenance of SAD, elimination or reduction of attentional 
bias may decrease associated anxiety symptoms. Recent studies examining this 
hypothesis indeed indicate that attention retraining may be an effective intervention for 
individuals with SAD.  In numerous studies, after completion of an attention retraining 
intervention, individuals with SAD showed less attentional bias toward threat cues and 
decreased SAD symptomatology (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, 
& Taylor, 2008; Li, Tan, Qian, & Lui, 2008; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 
2009).  
Attention Retraining as a Treatment for SAD – Previous Study Findings 
Studies employing attention retraining interventions have demonstrated 
impressive results with regard to decreasing SAD symptomatology. For example, Amir 
and colleagues (2008) examined the effect of a single session of attention retraining on 
response to a public speaking challenge in a group of individuals with SAD. In this study, 
all participants demonstrated elevated scores (minimum score = 26) on the Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987) at baseline. Participants were randomized 
into an active retraining condition (N = 47) or a control condition (N = 47) and completed 
one session of training on a dot-probe task before engaging in a challenging speech task. 
Specifically, participants had two minutes to prepare a speech on a controversial topic 
and then spoke on the topic for up to five minutes. Results showed that participants did 
not differ on levels of anxiety prior to training as measured by the Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory, state version (STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & 
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Jacobs, 1983) but immediately following the training session participants did differ, with 
the attention retraining group showing lower levels of anxiety compared to the control 
group. Additionally, blind assessors rated the speeches of the participants in the retraining 
group as better than those of the control group.  
More recently, Amir and colleagues (2009) conducted a randomized double-blind 
placebo-controlled trial examining the effects of attention retraining on individuals with 
SAD. In this study, participants were randomized into an active retraining condition (N = 
22) or a control condition (N = 26) and completed eight sessions of training on a dot-
probe task. Post-intervention, the patients in the active retraining condition versus control 
condition demonstrated a decrease in anxiety symptoms as measured by the LSAS, the 
Social Phobia Anxiety Inventory (SPAI; Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989), and 
the Sheehan Disability Scale (SDS; Leon, Olfson, Portera, Faber, & Sheehan, 1997). 
Furthermore, at post-intervention, 50% of patients in the attention retraining group no 
longer met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4
th
 edition (DSM-IV-
TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnostic criteria for SAD as compared to 
14% of patients in the control condition. This reduction in SAD symptomatology was 
maintained for patients in the attention retraining condition at 4-month follow-up.  
A recent study by Schmidt and colleagues (2009) also suggests that attention 
retraining has a strong therapeutic effect. In this study, SAD patients were randomized 
into two groups: one group received active attention retraining and the other received 
training on a control dot-probe task. Post-treatment, patients in the retraining condition 
showed decreased SAD symptoms compared to those patients in the control condition. 
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Specifically, 72% of the patients in the active retraining condition no longer meet DSM-
IV diagnostic criteria for SAD, as compared to 11% of patients in the control condition.  
The majority of attention bias modification intervention studies involving 
individuals with social anxiety disorder, as well as other anxiety disorders (e.g., 
generalized anxiety disorder), show promising results. The results from these studies 
formed the basis for Aim 1, Hypothesis 1 of the current study: After completing the 
attention retraining intervention, SAD patients assigned to the active retraining condition 
will show greater reductions in attentional bias (as measured by reaction time and 
accuracy) compared to SAD patients in the placebo control condition. They also formed 
the basis for Aim 1, Hypothesis 2: Patients in the active retraining condition will show 
greater reductions in SAD symptomatology at post-intervention as compared to SAD 
patients in the placebo control condition.  
Given the growing interest in attention retraining interventions in recent years, 
numerous meta-analyses have been published quantifying the results of attention 
retraining studies (e.g., Beard, Sawyer, & Hofmann, 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion 
& Ruscio 2011). These reviews, however, have arrived at somewhat discrepant findings. 
For example, a review by Hakamata et al. (2010), based on 12 studies, concluded that 
attention retraining interventions produced a large effect on attentional bias (Cohen’s d = 
1.16) and a medium effect on anxiety (Cohen’s d = 0.61), whereas a review by Hallion 
and Ruscio (2011), based on 21 studies, revealed small but reliable effects on attention 
(Hedges’ g = .29), and anxiety (Hedges’ g = .23). The most recent meta-analysis to 
examine attention retraining studies (Beard et al., 2012) showed that for studies that 
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assessed changes in symptoms following a multi-session attention retraining protocol, 
and trained towards neutral, the average pre–post effect size estimate was Hedges’ g = 
0.41. Therefore, the Beard et al. (2012) meta-analysis confirmed the results of the 
Hakamata (2010) review and suggests that attention retraining has a large and reliable 
effect on attentional bias. However, with regard to symptom change, although both 
reviews showed moderate effects, these results must be interpreted with caution, as the 
fail-safe N calculations were not robust in either review. Therefore, both reviews suggest 
that there is currently insufficient data to determine the effect of attention retraining on 
subjective experience.  
Since the proposal of the current study and the publication of the above-
mentioned meta-analyses (Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 
2011), four attention retraining intervention studies reporting null findings have been 
published (Boettcher, Berger, & Renneberg, 2012; Carlbring et al., 2012; Julian, Beard, 
Schmidt, Power & Smits, 2012; Neubauer et al., 2013). Three of the studies examined 
home-based attention retraining programs (Boettcher et al., 2012; Carlbring et al., 2012; 
Neubauer et al., 2013). Carlbring and colleagues conducted a double-blind randomized 
controlled study in which 79 participants diagnosed with SAD were assigned to either an 
active attention training condition or a placebo control condition. Both conditions 
involved 8 training sessions of the computerized intervention conducted in participants’ 
homes. Results revealed an overall effect of time on all domains measured (e.g., social 
anxiety symptoms, depression symptoms, overall anxiety levels, and quality of life), but 
no group x time interactions, suggesting no difference between the active and placebo 
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conditions. Interestingly, this study used the same stimuli as the Amir et al. (2009) study 
that showed significant group differences in favor of the active condition. Both the 
Boettcher et al. (2012) study (N = 68) and the Neubauer et al. (2013) study (N = 56) also 
employed an internet-delivered home-based intervention and showed similar results; 
again, there was a small reduction in symptoms (i.e., social anxiety and depressive 
symptoms), but no evidence for superiority of the active retraining condition.  
The final study reporting null findings was conducted in the laboratory and 
examined the effect of a single-session of attention retraining in conjunction with 
exercise or rest on a group of socially anxious undergraduates (LSAS scores >26) (Julian 
et al., 2012). Participants (N = 112) were randomized to one of the four following 
conditions: (1) active attention retraining + exercise; (2) active attention retraining + rest; 
(3) placebo training + exercise; and (4) placebo training + rest. Exercise and rest were 
added to the study design in light of evidence suggesting that exercise has beneficial 
effects on attentional control. Participants completed behavioral assessments, exercise 
(20 min) or rest (30 min), and then the attention retraining or control paradigm. Finally, 
all participants completed a behavioral assessment that consisted of a 5-minute speech. 
This study sought to replicate the results of the Amir and colleagues (2008) single-
session study that showed robust results in favor of the active attention retraining 
condition, and therefore used the same stimuli and training procedures. However, results 
revealed no replication. The authors state, “Our findings do not support the hypotheses. 
Specifically, there were no singular effects of attention retraining on attention bias or 
anxiety reactivity and no interactive effects of attention training and exercise on attention 
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bias or anxiety reactivity, nor did these hypothesized effects vary as a function of 
attention bias at baseline” (p.356). 
Taken together, findings from individual studies and meta-analyses suggest that 
attention retraining may be an efficacious clinical intervention for SAD; however, as 
highlighted by the meta-analyses and recent publications reporting null findings, more 
multi-session treatment interventions employing attention retraining are necessary to 
determine the efficacy of attention retraining at reducing anxiety symptoms. The current 
study is one such treatment study; it builds upon the results of previous research 
examining symptom change, and contributes to the body of knowledge on attentional 
biases in SAD by examining neural changes that occur as the result of attention 
retraining.   
Why Study Changes in Brain Function as a Result of Attention Retraining? 
Although there is evidence for the efficacy of attention retraining as a treatment 
for SAD, no studies have yet examined associated changes in brain function. 
Investigating the effects of attention retraining at the neural level through the use of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is an important first step towards gaining 
a greater understanding of the functional pathways of attentional bias in individuals with 
SAD. To date, neuroimaging techniques have played a crucial role in clarifying the 
pathophysiology of SAD. Specifically, these techniques have helped elucidate 
abnormalities in brain function and circuitry that lead to deficits in information 
processing and emotion regulation underlying the disorder (e.g., Freitas-Ferrari et al., 
2010; Mennin, McLaughlin, & Flanagan, 2009). Gaining a better understanding of the 
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neural underpinnings of SAD, by identifying abnormal processes and neural pathways, 
has major clinical implications for improving upon and devising new treatments directly 
targeting these deficits. 
Amygdala - Prefrontal Cortex Circuit 
There is an emerging body of research implicating the importance of connectivity 
between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the neural circuitry guiding 
attention to threat (Banks, Eddy, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2007; Bishop, 2007; Bishop, 
Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004). The relationship between amygdala and PFC activity 
in the development and persistence of anxiety was first elucidated by findings from 
studies in animal models (e.g., Caldji, Diori, & Meaney, 2003) and has subsequently been 
extended to humans (e.g., LeDoux, 2000). Neuroimaging studies examining this circuitry 
suggest that bottom-up amygdalar signals promote initial vigilance towards threat, while 
top-down PFC signals later modulate and regulate these signals. Anxiety disorders appear 
to be characterized by disrupted limbic-prefrontal circuitry; specifically, exaggerated 
limbic amygdalar response to threat, coupled with deficient PFC activity (Bishop, 2007).   
Role of amygdala in face processing and attentional bias in SAD. The 
amygdala is a region of the limbic system known to serve broad functions in the 
processing of emotional information and has consistently been implicated in the normal 
processing of emotional facial expressions (e.g., Phillips et al., 2001). Face processing, 
particularly of negative facial expressions, is thought to be an area of deficit in 
individuals with SAD (e.g., Stein, Goldin, Sareen, Zorrilla, & Brown, 2002). Given that 
individuals with SAD have information processing biases for negative social stimuli, it is 
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not surprising that studies consistently find that these individuals show hyperactivation in 
the amygdala in response to socially threatening stimuli (Blair et al., 2008; Gentili et al., 
2008; Phan, Fitzgerald, Nathan, & Tancer, 2006; Stein et al., 2002; Straube, Mentzel, & 
Miltner, 2005).  
The first study to examine neural activity associated with emotional face 
processing in SAD found greater activation in the left amygdala in SAD patients as 
compared to healthy controls when viewing angry or contemptuous faces (Stein et al., 
2002). In this study, 15 patients with SAD (generalized) and 15 healthy controls 
completed an fMRI task in which they viewed a series of angry, fearful, contemptuous, 
happy, or non-expressive facial expressions, and were asked to identify the gender 
associated with each stimulus. Results indicated that SAD patients produced significantly 
greater blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) responses in the left anterior medial 
temporal lobe region (which includes the amygdala, uncus, and parahippocampal gyrus) 
than healthy controls while viewing angry and contemptuous faces versus happy faces. 
There was no difference in BOLD signals for fearful or non-expressive faces compared to 
happy faces. These results suggest that SAD patients may exhibit a hyperactive amygdala 
response to socially salient facial expressions (i.e., contemptuous and angry faces) as 
compared to other non-disorder specific facial expressions (i.e., happy and neutral faces). 
The degree of hyperactivation in regions of the limbic system in SAD patients has 
been shown to be correlated with SAD symptom severity (Phan et al., 2006; Shah, 
Klumpp, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2009).  Phan and colleagues (2006) conducted a 
study comparing BOLD signals between 10 SAD patients and 10 healthy controls during 
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an fMRI task in which participants viewed blocks of faces of different emotional 
expressions (i.e., angry, disgusted, fearful, and happy). Results indicated that compared to 
healthy controls, SAD patients exhibited greater activation in the right amygdala when 
viewing negative faces (i.e., angry, disgust, and fearful) relative to happy faces. 
Furthermore, level of amygdala activation was positively correlated with SAD symptom 
severity. Shah and colleagues (2009) conducted a similar study with 11 SAD patients and 
11 healthy controls in which participants were asked to view blocks of positive, negative, 
and neutral pictures (IAPS images). Results showed that SAD patients exhibited greater 
bilateral amygdala and insula activation than healthy controls while viewing negative 
images. Within the SAD group, the level of amygdala activation was positively correlated 
with SAD symptom severity.  
There is also evidence to suggest that the amygdala may be hyper-responsive to 
positive as well as negative social stimuli in SAD populations (Straube et al., 2005). 
Straube and colleagues (2005) conducted a study in which brain activations of nine SAD 
patients were compared to nine healthy controls on an fMRI task in which participants 
viewed blocks of happy, angry, or neutral pictures. Results showed that SAD patients as 
compared to healthy controls had greater right amygdala activation to happy faces as well 
as angry faces. These findings suggest that the amygdala may play a more general role in 
the processing of emotional information, and that for SAD patients, the amygdala may be 
involved in the processing of safety signals (e.g., happy faces) as well as the processing 
of emotional threat (e.g., angry faces).  
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In search of a disorder-specific neurobiological deficit in SAD, meta-analyses 
have examined neuroimaging findings in individuals with SAD and confirmed the 
presence of dysfunctional hyperactivation in the amygdala, insula, and visual areas of the 
brain (Etkin & Wager, 2007; Freitas-Ferrari et al. (2010).  However, these meta-analyses 
highlight discrepant findings across studies. For example, studies show differences in 
lateralization; some studies have shown hyperactivation in the right amygdala (e.g., Phan 
et al., 2006), while others have shown it in the left amygdala (e.g., Stein et al., 2002; 
Straube et al., 2004) and others bilaterally (e.g., Shah et al., 2008). The Freitas-Ferrari et 
al. (2010) meta-analysis states that such discrepancies may in part be due to 
methodological differences between the studies. For example, studies that employ fMRI 
tasks requiring participants to respond to certain aspects of a stimulus may recruit greater 
attentional resources and require greater support from higher cortical regions than tasks 
simply requiring the participant to view the stimulus without responding. Such 
differences make it challenging to draw meaningful comparisons across studies.  
Role of prefrontal cortex in attentional bias in SAD. Signals from the PFC also 
play an important role in the neural circuitry guiding attention to threat. As stated above, 
top-down signals from the PFC are believed to flexibly modulate bottom-up signals 
generated by the amygdala (Bishop, 2007; Hariri, Mattay, Tessitore, Fera, & Weinberger, 
2003).  
Neuroimaging studies examining the neural mechanisms of attentional bias in 
clinically anxious populations are beginning to emerge. For example, Monk and 
colleagues (2006) examined neural correlates of attentional bias in a sample of 
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adolescents with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). In this study, 18 adolescents and 
15 matched healthy controls (age range 7-19 years) underwent a dot probe fMRI task 
(using angry and neutral faces stimuli) on one occasion. Results indicated that relative to 
the healthy controls, patients with GAD exhibited greater attentional bias away from 
angry faces (F = 4.90, df = 30, p < 0.05) and increased right ventrolateral PFC activation 
while viewing angry faces (t = 3.91, df = 30, p < 0.001). (It is important to take into 
consideration developmental age when interpreting these results, particularly in terms of 
attentional bias; studies examining attentional bias in adult ( 18 years) GAD patients 
show an attentional bias towards threat). Ten of the 18 GAD patients in this study had 
comorbid SAD, and secondary analyses were conducted to explore the effect of social 
anxiety symptoms on neural activation. Results of these analyses revealed no differences 
between the two patient groups with regard to level of ventrolateral PFC activation (t = 
0.35, df = 16, p = 0.73). Within the entire GAD group, ventrolateral PFC activity was 
inversely related to anxiety severity, suggesting that the greater the hypo-reactivity in the 
PFC, the more severe the symptom presentation. The authors suggest that patients with 
more severe GAD may not be recruiting resources as effectively from the ventrolateral 
PFC in order to modulate abnormal limbic responses. No group differences in the 
amygdala were found.  
 The relationship between activation in the lateral PFC and the amygdala was 
further examined by the same research team using masked angry faces in a sample of 
children and adolescents with GAD (Monk et al., 2008). In this study, 17 youth with 
GAD and 12 healthy controls participated in a dot-probe task using masked angry and 
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neutral faces. Results indicated that the patients with GAD exhibited increased right 
amygdala activation in response to the angry faces compared to healthy controls and that 
the level of amygdala activation was positively correlated with GAD symptom severity. 
Additionally, results of the entire sample revealed a strong negative relationship between 
amygdala activation and right ventrolateral PFC activation when viewing angry faces. In 
the GAD group, this relationship was not as strong, suggesting that GAD patients were 
not recruiting as much compensatory response from the PFC as the healthy control group.  
 PFC activity and attentional bias has also been examined in late-life (age  60) 
GAD patients (Price, Eldreth, & Mohlman, 2011). In this study, 16 GAD patients (mean 
age  = 66 yrs) and 12 age-matched healthy controls completed an emotional Stroop task 
in the scanner. Results indicated that during the presentation of negative words (in 
comparison to neutral words), the GAD patients exhibited decreased activation in the 
PFC whereas the healthy controls exhibited increased activation in this region. Across all 
participants, greater attentional bias for negative words was correlated with decreased 
PFC recruitment.  
The effect of attention training interventions on neural function has just recently 
begun to be explored. Only one such fMRI study has been published to date; it examined 
the effects of a single attention-retraining session in healthy individuals and showed 
changes in prefrontal attention mechanisms post-training (Browning, Holmes, Murphy, 
Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010). In this study, 53 healthy participants (age  18) were 
randomly assigned to either train attention towards threat (i.e., “attend-threat” condition) 
or train attention away from threat (i.e., “avoid-threat” condition). Each participant 
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completed one computerized training session using threat and neutral words. Following 
the training, approximately half of the total sample completed a behavioral assessment of 
the training outside the scanner, and the other half completed an fMRI assessment of the 
training. Both assessments used faces rather than words. The fMRI assessment task 
consisted of faces flanked by two bars in different orientations. One face (either fearful or 
neutral) and two bars appeared on each trial. The participant was instructed to respond to 
the gender of the face, or the orientation of the flanking bars (depending on the direction 
of attention that was being manipulated (i.e., either toward or away from the face)). 
Results indicated that for the subsample that completed the fMRI assessment, the training 
had altered lateral frontal activation to emotional stimuli. Specifically, lateral PFC 
activity was greatest on trials when participants were asked to attend to the stimulus 
opposite of their trainings (i.e., when the “attend-threat” group attended to neutral stimuli, 
and the “avoid-threat” group attended to threat stimuli). This study suggests that a single 
session of attention retraining can modify frontal control over the processing of emotional 
stimuli in healthy individuals. To date, no studies have been published examining the 
effect of attention retraining on neural activity in clinical populations, including SAD.  
The results from the studies described above form the basis for the following 
hypotheses:  Aim 2, Hypothesis 1: Both patients and controls will show activation in the 
amygdala and PFC during the presentation of angry faces as compared to neutral faces; 
and Aim 2, Hypothesis 2: Patients with SAD will show greater activation in the 
amygdala, and less activation in the PFC during the presentation of angry faces than 
healthy controls.  
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Implications of Gaining a Better Understanding of the Neural Correlates of 
Attention Retraining in Individuals with SAD 
Given the promise of attention retraining in effectively mitigating the symptoms 
of SAD, it is important to gain insight into changes in neural activity as a result of the 
intervention. This led to the development of the Hypothesis of Aim 3: SAD patients 
randomly assigned to the active retraining condition will show attenuation of activation in 
the amygdala, and increased activation in the PFC, during the presentation of angry faces 
at post-treatment compared to SAD patients assigned to the placebo control condition. 
The current study is the first to examine neural changes in patients with SAD as the result 
of an attention retraining intervention. Understanding the ways in which attention 
retraining exerts an influence at the neural level in SAD patients may be particularly 
valuable in light of evidence from neuroscience (detailed above) implicating 
hyperactivity in limbic structures and hypoactivity in the PFC (Etkin & Wager, 2007). 
These findings suggest that interventions that modify neural activity in these structures 
may be necessary to achieve long-term treatment gains and to prevent relapse. Overall, 
investigating the neurobiology of individuals with SAD will generate a deeper 
understanding of the disorder and may lead to more effective treatment. 
Specific Aims of the Current Study 
The present study sought to use fMRI in a sample of patients with SAD to 
measure neural changes as the result of an attention retraining intervention. Specifically, 
patients with SAD were randomly assigned to an active retraining condition or a placebo 
control condition and underwent fMRI before and after eight, 15-minute training sessions 
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of a validated attention retraining paradigm or a placebo dot-probe task. The main 
scientific goal of the current study was to identify neural changes as the result of an 
experimental manipulation of attention, and to examine the effects of this intervention on 
SAD symptoms. 
This investigation had three specific aims: 
Aim 1: To experimentally manipulate attentional bias in patients with SAD through an 
attention retraining intervention.   
Hypothesis 1:  Post-intervention, SAD patients assigned to the active retraining 
condition will show greater reductions in attentional bias (as measured by reaction 
time) compared to SAD patients in the placebo control condition.  
Hypothesis 2: Patients in the active retraining condition will show greater 
reduction in SAD symptomatology at post-intervention compared to SAD patients 
in the placebo control condition.  
Aim 2: To examine neural differences in patients with SAD vs. healthy controls during 
an fMRI dot-probe task.  
Hypothesis 1: Both patients and controls will show greater activation in the 
amygdala and PFC during the presentation of angry faces as compared to neutral 
faces.  
Hypothesis 2: Patients with SAD will show greater activation in the amygdala, 
and less activation in the PFC, during the presentation of angry faces than healthy 
controls.  
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Aim 3: To examine changes in neural activity as a result of the attention retraining 
intervention.  
Hypothesis: SAD patients randomly assigned to the active retraining condition 
will show attenuation of activation in the amygdala, and increased activation in 
the PFC, during the presentation of angry faces at post-treatment compared to 
SAD patients assigned to the placebo control condition.  
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Method 
Research Design 
The current study used a 2 (condition: attention retraining vs. placebo control) x 2 
(time: pre-intervention, post-intervention) design. After meeting inclusion criteria 
(described below), informed consent was obtained. All patients with SAD completed an 
initial set of clinician-administered and self-report measures to assess baseline symptom 
severity. All patients with SAD participated in two identical scanning sessions pre- and 
post-intervention at the Athinoula A. Martinos Imaging Center at McGovern Institute for 
Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), detailed below. Following 
the first pre-intervention fMRI scanning session, patients were randomized into either the 
active attention retraining condition or the placebo control condition. Regardless of 
condition, all participants completed eight, 15-minute computerized training sessions at 
the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders (CARD) at Boston University (BU). 
Training sessions took place twice weekly, for a total of four weeks of training. 
Subsequent to the last training session, participants completed the 2
nd
 scanning session.  
The sequence of the study for SAD patients was as follows: 
Session # Procedures Location 
Session 1  Administration of symptom measures 
 1st scanning session 
MIT 
Sessions 2-9  Administration of symptom measures 
 Attention retraining intervention or placebo 
 (Before the 1st and after the 8th training 
session, patients completed a computerized test 
of attentional bias) 
CARD 
Session 10  Administration of symptom measures  
 2nd scanning session 
MIT 
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The participation of healthy control subjects (n = 16) was limited to only one 
scanning session (i.e., they did not participate in the intervention or 2
nd
 scanning session).  
 
The sequence of the study for healthy control participants was as follows: 
Session # Procedures Location 
Session 1  
(only session) 
 Scanning session MIT 
 
Participants  
 A total of 32 subjects meeting DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for SAD, generalized 
subtype, participated in the study. Sixteen of these patients were randomized into the 
active retraining condition and 16 into the placebo condition. Additionally, 16 subjects 
with no psychopathology participated as healthy controls and completed one scanning 
session in order to examine differences in brain activation between healthy controls and 
SAD patients at pre-treatment.  
 Patients with Social Anxiety Disorder. The minimum severity level for 
inclusion into the study was a DSM-IV diagnosis of SAD, generalized subtype, according 
to the SCID or ADIS-IV (i.e., a clinician’s severity rating of 4, on a 0-8 scale) and a 
LSAS total score of  60. Patients seeking treatment at CARD who met eligibility criteria 
were invited to participate while they remained on the treatment waitlist. Patients were 
also recruited through advertisements in the community.  
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Healthy Control subjects. Healthy Controls were recruited from the general 
community by advertisement and were age, gender, and handedness matched to the SAD 
patient group. All healthy volunteers were screened for current and lifetime 
psychopathology using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders - 
Patient Edition (SCID-I/P, First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). To be eligible, 
subjects must have had no current or lifetime diagnosis of a psychiatric illness.   
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
All screening was completed by the principal investigator. All patients were 18 
years of age with a primary diagnosis of SAD, generalized subtype. All healthy controls 
were 18 years of age with no history of psychopathology. If a subject agreed to 
participate, informed consent was obtained following consideration of the following 
exclusion criteria based on current recommendations for fMRI studies as implemented at 
the Athinoula A. Martinos Imaging Center at McGovern Institute for Brain Research at 
MIT: 
 History of head injury resulting in prolonged loss of consciousness  
 History of prior neurosurgical procedure 
 Metal in the head, metal injury to the eyes 
 Signs of increased intracranial pressure 
 Implanted pacemaker, medication pump, vagal stimulator, deep brain stimulator, 
or ventriculo-peritoneal shunt 
 Current pregnancy  
 Chronic treatment with medications 
 Claustrophobia 
Additional exclusion criteria were as follows:   
 Current suicidal or homicidal ideation 
 History of or current psychosis 
 Current diagnosis of alcohol or substance dependence, excluding nicotine 
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 Current use of “as-needed” psychiatric medications for the reduction of anxiety 
symptoms 
 
The decision to exclude patients using “as-needed” psychiatric medication was based 
upon concerns that these medications would artificially alter neural patterns of emotional 
responding. Because we were interested in identifying patterns of neural activation during 
emotional processing in a clinical population, the effect of “as-needed” medication 
represented a significant confound. However, patients on a stable dose of psychiatric 
medication (i.e., on a consistent dose and timing regimen for 3 months prior to study 
initiation) were included in the study.  
Assessment Instruments 
A battery of clinician-administered and self-report measures was administered in 
order to assess severity of SAD symptoms and to screen formally for suicidality.  
Clinician administered measures:  
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders - Patient Edition 
(SCID-I/P; First et al., 1996). This semi-structured interview has good psychometric 
properties and focuses on all major psychiatric illnesses. This instrument was used to 
screen healthy controls to determine eligibility for participation (i.e., no current or 
lifetime diagnosis of a psychiatric illness). 
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV- Treatment follow-up version 
(Mini-ADIS-IV; Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994). This semi-structured, diagnostic 
clinical interview focuses on DSM-IV diagnoses of anxiety disorders and their 
accompanying mood states, somatoform disorders, and substance and alcohol use. 
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Diagnoses are assigned a clinical severity rating (CSR) on a scale from 0 (no 
symptoms/impairment) to 8 (extremely severe symptoms/impairment), with a rating of 4 
or above indicating that DSM diagnostic criteria has been met. This measure has 
demonstrated excellent inter-rater reliability for the anxiety and mood disorders. 
Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery & Asberg, 
1979). The MADRS is designed to measure the overall severity of depressive symptoms 
and has demonstrated good reliability as well as good specificity for depression compared 
to anxiety symptomatology.  
 Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987). The LSAS is a 24-item 
scale that provides separate scores for fear and avoidance in social and performance 
situations. This measure shows very good psychometric properties. 
Range of Impaired Functioning Tool (LIFE-RIFT; Leon et al., 1999). This 
clinician administered measure assesses functional impairment in the following areas: 
work (includes employment, household, and student); interpersonal relations (includes 
spouse, children, other relatives, and friends); satisfaction; and recreation.  This measure 
can be used on a variety of populations.  
Self-report measures: 
 Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000). The SPIN is a 17-item self-
report measure originally created as a screening tool to identify individuals with social 
anxiety disorder, and to assess avoidance, fear, and physiological responses to social and 
performance situations. The reliability, validity, and test-retest reliability of SPIN has 
been demonstrated in both clinical and non-clinical samples.  
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Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II: Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II 
is a 21-item measure of depression symptoms.  It has been shown to reliably assess 
aspects of depressive symptoms, including suicidality. 
Affective Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Hofmann & Kashdan, 2010). The ASQ is a 
20-item questionnaire used to measure individual differences in emotion regulation. The 
measure has three major subscales examining different emotion regulation strategies: 
Concealing subscale (8 items), Adjusting subscale (7 items), and Tolerating subscale (5 
items). The measure shows satisfactory internal consistency.  
Anxiety Control Questionnaire (ACQ; Rapee, Craske, Brown, & Barlow, 1996). 
The ACQ assesses perceived control over external threats and emotional reactions. 
Participants rate beliefs on a scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). This 
measure consists of 30 items, 14 of which make up the “reactions” subscale (e.g., “When 
I am in a stressful situation, I am able to stop myself from breathing too hard”), and 16 of 
which make up the “events” subscale (e.g., “I can usually influence the degree to which a 
situation is potentially threatening to me”). The ACQ total score has demonstrated good 
test–retest reliability, internal consistency, and convergent validity. 
Experimental Tasks 
Assessment and intervention tasks delivered at BU 
Attentional bias assessment task. To assess attentional bias at pre- and post- 
intervention, patients completed two 20-minute sessions of a modified Posner task 
(Posner, 1980), once before and once after completing the eight training sessions. The 
stimuli used during this assessment task were five social threat words (e.g., ignored, 
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foolish), five physical threat words (e.g., ambulance, assault), and five neutral words 
(e.g., flag, plumbing), Words were chosen for this assessment task, rather than faces, to 
prevent any confound with the training trials (which used faces). During each trial, the 
participant saw a fixation cross and two small rectangles, one to the left of the fixation 
cross and one to the right. On each trial, a word (either socially-threatening, physically-
threatening, or neutral) appeared within one of the rectangles while the other rectangle 
remained blank. The word appeared for 600 ms and then disappeared. Then a probe (an 
arrow, either “” or “”) appeared in one of the rectangles. The participant was 
instructed to note the orientation of the arrow as quickly and accurately as possible by 
clicking the left or right mouse button (left for , right for ). Upon responding, the next 
trial commenced. Each assessment session consisted of 288 trials. One-hundred ninety-
two trials (two-thirds of the trials) were valid in which the probe appeared in the position 
previously occupied by the word, 48 trials (one-sixth of the trials) were invalid in which 
the probed appeared in the empty rectangle, and 48 trials (one-sixth of the trials) were un-
cued in which no probe appeared. Reaction times to invalid and valid trials were used to 
calculate each participant’s attentional bias (see Results section for formula).  
 Instructions for this assessment task read: “In this task you will see a cross (+) in 
the middle of the screen and two rectangles on either side of the cross. Please focus on 
the cross during the entire experiment. The screen will then clear and you will see a word 
in the left or right rectangle. The word will then be followed by an arrow that will usually 
appear on the same side of the screen as the word. However, once in a while the target 
arrow will appear on the opposite side of the screen from the word. Your job is to press 
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the left button on the mouse if the arrow is facing up and the right button on the mouse if 
the arrow is facing down. That is, regardless of the location of the arrow, press the left 
button if the arrow if facing up and the right button if the arrow is facing down.” 
Attentional bias modification training task. Participants were randomly assigned 
to participate in the attention retraining condition or the placebo control condition. 
Patients were blind to the condition they were assigned. Regardless of treatment 
condition, participants completed eight training sessions (each lasting approximately 15 
minutes) of a modified dot-probe task at BU (see Figure 1). The training intervention 
used in the current study was identical to that used by Amir and colleagues (2009). The 
modified dot-probe task was as follows: A fixation cross (+) appeared on the computer 
screen. After 500 ms the cross disappeared and two pictures appeared, one above and one 
below where the fixation cross had previously been. The pictures were neutral faces (i.e., 
expressionless) or disgust faces (i.e., socially threatening). After 500 ms the faces 
disappeared and either the letter “F” or “E” appeared where one of the faces had 
previously been. The participant was instructed to indicate as quickly and accurately as 
possible which letter was presented by pressing the left or right button on the computer 
mouse. Immediately after the participant responded, a new fixation cross appeared and 
the next trial commenced. Each training session consisted of 160 trials comprising all 
combinations of probe type (E or F), probe position (top or bottom), and face type 
(neutral or disgust). Thirty-two of the trials (20% of the trials) included only neutral faces 
in order to prevent participants from guessing the mechanism underlying the training 
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paradigm. The remaining 128 trials (80% of the trials) included one neutral and one 
disgust face.  
 The faces used during the trainings were selected from a standardized face set of 
emotional expressions (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). The faces consisted of eight 
individuals, four men and four women. A threatening (i.e., disgust) and neutral 
expression was used from each individual. Disgust expressions, rather than other 
emotional expressions (e.g., anger) were chosen for the following reasons: disgust 
conveys rejection and dislike – a central concern of patients with SAD; research has 
shown a strong attentional bias toward disgust in socially anxious individuals (Pishyar, 
Harris, & Menzies, 2004); and disgust has shown the most dramatic training effects in 
previous trials (Amir et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2009).  
 Instructions for the attention retraining sessions read: “In this section you will be 
asked to perform a practice task. No computer knowledge is required for performing the 
task. Simply view photographs and decided whether a letter is an E or an F. Specifically, 
after you press Start, you will see a plus sign (“+”) in the center of the screen. Please 
focus on this plus sign. The plus sign will then disappear and you will be presented with 
two faces, one on top and one on bottom. Your task is to look at the top face. Then, the 
faces will disappear and a letter will appear replacing the top or the bottom face. The 
letter will with be an “E” or an “F”. If the letter is an “E” press the button on the mouse 
corresponding to the letter E (left mouse button). If the letter is an F, press the button on 
the mouse corresponding to the letter F (the right mouse button). After you make your 
decision, the next trial will begin with a plus sign. Please work as quickly and accurately 
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as you can. Please rest your fingers on the mouse buttons, index finger on the left button 
and middle finger on the right button. Also leave your mouse pointer on the button that 
will appear labeled “E” or “F”.” 
Attention retraining condition. In the active attention retraining condition, on 
trials including one neutral and one disgust face (i.e., 80% of the trials), the probe always 
replaced the neutral face, thereby training the participant to focus attention on the neutral 
(i.e., non-threatening) stimulus. This condition was designed to enhance attentional 
engagement away from social threat cues (i.e., disgust faces). 
Placebo control condition. In the placebo control condition, on trials including 
one neutral face and one disgust face, the probe was always paired equally with neutral 
faces and disgust faces.  
fMRI Task 
fMRI dot probe paradigm. Participants completed a modified dot-probe task in 
the scanner at pre- and post-intervention. The task was modeled after Pourtois et al. 
(2006), with the exception that angry (i.e., socially-threatening) faces were used instead 
of fearful faces. Face stimuli were grayscale photographs from Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
of eight different individuals (4 males, 4 females), each with three possible expressions 
(neutral, happy, angry). Faces were calibrated for low-level visual properties (i.e., 
luminance, size, and spatial frequency) for the different emotion conditions. Pairs of 
faces were displayed, one face on the right of the screen and one face on the left. These 
face pairs always consisted of one emotional face (i.e., happy or angry) and one neutral 
face. The emotional face appeared with equal frequency (i.e., 50% of the time) in the 
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right and the left visual fields. Four different pair conditions (2 emotions × 2 sides) were 
created to yield four different bilateral face displays. For each condition, 24 pairs were 
obtained by combining each individual with two other individuals. The actual task was as 
follows (see Figure 2): A fixation cross (+) remained centered at the bottom of the screen 
throughout the task. A pair of faces appeared on the screen and remained for 100 ms 
before disappearing. A dim gray bar (the target) then appeared in the former location of 
either the emotional face or the neutral face. The target was a single rectangular bar 
displayed either in a horizontal or vertical orientation. The target unpredictably replaced 
either the emotional face (50% of the time – valid cue type [i.e., probe appears in the 
location of the cue]) or neutral face (50% of the time – invalid cue type [i.e., probe 
appears in the location opposite the cue]). When the target was presented, either the 
horizontal or the vertical line segment of the fixation cross at the bottom of the screen 
thickened. The participant was instructed to indicate on the response box whether the 
target was in the same or different orientation as the thickened line segment of the 
fixation cross.  This ensured that participants oriented covertly to the peripheral bars, 
while maintaining fixation on the central cross throughout the experiment. Each trial took 
2000 ms to complete (1000 ms face phase, 1000 ms target phase). A total of 600 trials 
were presented in random order in an event-related design: 100 angry valid, 100 angry 
invalid, 100 happy valid, 100 happy invalid, 100 angry cue only, 100 happy cue only. 
The entire task took approximately 25 minutes to complete (3 runs of approximately 8 
minutes). Participants practiced this task outside of the scanner prior to each scanning 
session. 
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 Instructions for this task in the scanner read: “Welcome! In this experiment, you 
will see a series of face pairs, most of which will be followed by a line either at the top 
left or top right corner. If the orientation of the line at the top is the same as the 
orientation of the thicker line of the cross in the middle, press 1. If they are not the same, 
press 2. If there is no line, fixate upon the cross in the middle. Get Ready.” 
Image Acquisition for fMRI 
 Data acquisition. Image acquisition was conducted at the A.A. Martinos Imaging 
Center at MIT, and performed on a Siemens 3T MAGNETOM Trio, A TimSystem 
(Siemens Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany). A 32-channel phased array head coil was 
employed for the purpose of capitalizing on the increased sensitivity afforded by high 
magnetic field strength and increased spatial resolution (Triantafyllou, Polimeni, & Wald, 
2011). Head immobilization was achieved using foam pads, and sound attenuation was 
provided by earplugs. Automatic slice prescription, based on alignment of localizer scans 
to a multi-subject atlas, was used to achieve a consistent head position across subjects. 
The visual stimulus system for fMRI studies used a Hitachi (CP-X1200 series) projector. 
The image was projected through a wave guide and was displayed on a rear projection 
screen. Responses were collected through an MRI-compatible response button box. 
 Anatomical MRI. Anatomical scans (whole-head, high-resolution T1-weighted 
multiecho MPRAGE volumes) were acquired prior to functional scanning for anatomical 
co-registration with fMRI (acquisition parameters: TR = 2530 ms, TE = 3.39 ms, flip 
angle = 7, TI = 1100 ms, 1.3x1.3x1.3 mm3).  The anatomical scanning sequence lasted 4 
minutes. 
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Dot Probe fMRI. BOLD functional data were acquired using a gradient-echo 
T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence. Thirty-two 4mm thick slices were 
acquired positioned parallel to the AC-PC line (imaging parameters: TR = 6sec, TE = 
30msec, flip angle = 90, bandwidth = 2300, echo spacing = 0.5, field of view = 
200x200, matrix size = 64x64). Prior to each scan, four images were acquired and 
discarded to allow for longitudinal magnetization to reach equilibrium. Participants 
completed 3 runs of the task (total time = approximately 25 minutes).  
Data Analysis 
Behavioral data from attention retraining intervention. To examine whether 
random assignment created differences in baseline characteristics across the active 
training group and the placebo control group, chi-square tests were conducted for 
categorical variables, and t-tests were conducted for continuous variables. 
To assess the efficacy of the attention retraining intervention on symptoms, a 2 
(group: attention retraining vs. placebo control) x 2 (time: pre-intervention score vs. post-
intervention score) mixed between-within analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated 
measures for time was conducted. These analyses were conducted for anxiety measures 
(i.e., LSAS, SPIN) and depression measures (i.e., BDI-II, MADRS). Effect sizes (i.e., 
partial eta squared (ηp
2
)) were interpreted based on the following guidelines suggested by 
Cohen (1988, pp. 284-7): .01 = small effect, .06 = medium effect, .14 = large effect. 
Attentional bias scores were calculated for each participant using the following 
difference formula described by MacLeod and Mathews (1988): (Mean reaction time to 
probes replacing neutral stimuli) – (Mean reaction to probes replacing threatening 
  
34 
stimuli) = Attentional bias towards threat. Using this formula, positive scores indicate an 
attentional bias towards threat, whereas negative scores indicate an attentional bias away 
from threat. A score of zero indicates neither vigilance nor avoidance of threatening 
stimuli (i.e., no attentional bias). To assess the efficacy of the attention retraining 
intervention on decreasing attentional bias towards threat, a 2 (group: attention retraining 
vs. placebo control) x 2 (time: pre-intervention attentional bias score vs. post-intervention 
attentional bias score) mixed between-within ANOVA with repeated measures for time 
was conducted. These results were interpreted using Cohen’s guidelines as described 
above. 
Standard multiple regression was used to assess the ability of certain independent 
variables (group, pre LSAS score, change in attention bias) to predict LSAS score at post-
treatment. Additionally, the relationship between change in social anxiety symptoms (as 
measured by LSAS change scores) and other variables (e.g., attentional bias, pre-
treatment LSAS score) was investigated using Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient. Preliminary analyses were performed to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Interpretation of correlation 
values were made using the following guidelines suggested by Cohen (1988, pp. 79-81): 
small  = .10 to .29 =; medium = .30 to .49; and large = .50 to 1.0.  
fMRI data analysis. Behavioral results (i.e., movement in the scanner (motion 
outliers), accuracy rates) across the SAD group and the healthy control group were 
examined using independent-samples t-tests. Attentional bias scores for the dot-probe 
task performed in the scanner were calculated using the same formula by MacLeod and 
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Mathews (1988) described above [i.e., (Mean reaction time to probes replacing neutral 
stimuli) – (Mean reaction to probes replacing threatening stimuli) = Attentional bias 
towards threat].  
 Data were analyzed using Nipype v0.4 (Neuroimaging in Python: Pipelines and 
Interfaces; http://nipy.org/nipype; Gorgolewski et al., 2011), a neuroimaging data 
processing framework. Nipype provides interfaces to multiple existing neuroimaging 
software (e.g., Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM), Freesurfer, FMRIB Software 
Library (FSL)), thereby allowing the use of different software packages to execute 
different components of the analysis in a single workflow. For the current study, 
structural data (cortical reconstruction and parcellation of anatomical images) were 
analyzed using the default processing stream Freesurfer v5.1.0 (Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 
1999; http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/). Functional data were analyzed in SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/) using workflows in Nipype v0.4. 
Image preprocessing consisted of motion correction (rigid-body realignment to the mean 
EPI image from the first functional run) and spatial smoothing (6mm isotropic FWHM 
3D Gaussian kernel). Slice timing correction was performed using SPM8. Motion and 
intensity outliers (functional volumes exceeding 1mm in differential motion or differing 
from the mean image intensity by > 3 SD) were identified using the Artifact Detection 
Tools (ART; http://www.nitrc.org/projects/artifact_detect/). Model design was 
implemented using the modelgen algorithm in Nipype.  
Subject-specific first-level analysis was applied using a general linear model 
approach. Regressors for each of the experimental conditions were entered into the 
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design matrix, as well as motion parameters and outliers (as detected by ART). The 
following 15 experimental conditions were examined: (1) task > rest; (2) Angry Valid; 
(3) Angry Invalid; (4) Angry Cue Only; (5) Happy Valid; (6) Happy Invalid; (7) Happy 
Cue Only; (8) Angry Cue Only > Happy Cue Only; (9) Angry Invalid > Angry Valid; 
(10) Angry Invalid > Happy Invalid; (11) Happy Invalid > Happy Valid; (12) Angry 
Invalid > Angry Cue Only; (13) Happy Invalid > Happy Cue Only; (14) Angry Valid > 
Angry Cue Only; (15) Happy Valid > Happy Cue Only. “Valid” indicates that the probe 
replaced the emotional face during an emotional/neutral face pair, whereas “Invalid” 
indicates that the probe replaced the neutral face. “Cue Only” indicates that no probe 
appeared after the presentation of a face pair.  
Within-subject estimation of the general linear model and contrasts were 
conducted in participants' native Echo Planar Imaging (EPI) space. The co-registration 
transformation between each participant's mean functional EPI volume and their T1-
weighted structural image was calculated using Freesurfer's BBRegister program. These 
transforms were applied to the contrast images from each participant's first-level analysis 
to insure accurate co-registration between functional data and high-resolution anatomy. 
Participants' high-resolution structural images were aligned to a common space (the 
1mmisotropic MNI152 template from FSL v4.1.6 (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/)) using 
nonlinear symmetric diffeomorphic mapping implemented in ANTS v.1.5 (Avants, 
Epstein, Grossman, & Gee, 2008; http://www.picsl.upenn.edu/ANTS/). The 
transformation matrix and deformation field from this spatial normalization were applied 
to each participant's co-registered first-level contrast images to align them to the common 
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space. Beta values from selected data files at specific regions of interest were extracted 
using the region-of-interest toolbox (Rex) and submitted to further analysis for contrasts 
of interests. Second-level (group comparisons) were performed using SPM8, thresholded 
at p < 0.05, and corrected for multiple comparisons via topographic false-discovery rate 
(FDR) correction at q = 0.05. 
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Results 
Participant Characteristics for Attention Retraining Intervention 
 A total of 34 SAD patients entered the study. Two of these participants were 
excluded due to diagnostic reasons that became apparent as the study progressed (i.e., 
both over-reported symptoms at the outset of the study). Analyses were performed on 
treatment completers (active group = 15, placebo control group = 16); this decision was 
based on the fact that only one participant did not complete the study (from active group). 
The demographic and clinical characteristics of the SAD study participants are provided 
in Table 1. Attentional bias assessment data (assessed with the Posner task) was not 
collected on one patient in the active group (due to computer malfunction) and one 
patient in the control group (the task was added after this first subject started the study).  
To examine whether random assignment created differences in baseline 
characteristics between individuals in the active condition as compared to the placebo 
control condition, chi-square tests were conducted for categorical variables, and t-tests 
were conducted for continuous variables. The active attention retraining condition and the 
placebo control condition did not differ on any demographic or clinical characteristics at 
baseline (ps > .33).  
Attention Retraining Intervention Results 
Effect of intervention on social anxiety symptoms. To assess the efficacy of the 
attention retraining intervention on symptoms of social anxiety, a 2 (group: attention 
retraining vs. placebo control) x 2 (time: pre-intervention LSAS score, post-intervention 
LSAS score) mixed between-within ANOVA with repeated measures for time was 
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conducted. Results revealed a significant main effect for time (Wilks’ Lambda = .51, F 
(1, 28) = 26.89, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .49), with both groups showing a reduction in LSAS 
scores from pre to post (see Table 2; Figure 3). However, in contrast to most previously 
published studies, and contrary to current study expectations, results did not reveal a 
significant interaction between group and time (Wilks’ Lambda = .97, F (1, 28) = .75, p = 
.39, ηp
2 
= .03). The main effect comparing the two training groups was not significant (F 
(1, 28) = .44, p = .52, ηp
2 
= .015), suggesting no differences in the effectiveness of the 
two training conditions (i.e., active training vs. placebo). Therefore, results indicate that 
the overall sample experienced a decrease in symptoms, however, this was not related to 
group. Thus, this study failed to provide support for Aim 1, Hypothesis 2 that patients in 
the active retraining condition would show greater reduction in SAD symptomatology at 
post-intervention than those patients assigned to the placebo control condition.  
The same result was seen when examining scores on the SPIN, a self-report 
measure of SAD symptomatology. Again, a mixed between-within ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for time (Wilks’ Lambda = .78, F (1, 28) = 8.13, p = .008, ηp
2 
= 
.23), with both groups showing a reduction in SPIN scores from pre to post. Results did 
not reveal a significant interaction between group and time (Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F (1, 
28) = .16, p = .69, ηp
2 
= .006). The main effect comparing the two training groups was not 
significant (F (1, 28) = .44, p = .54, ηp
2 
= .019), again suggesting no differences in the 
effectiveness of the two training conditions. 
Effect of intervention on depressive symptoms. Social anxiety and depression 
are highly comorbid disorders (Kessler et al., 2005); therefore, changes in depression 
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symptomatology were also explored. Changes in depressive symptoms were similar to 
that of SAD symptoms. Specifically, when examining BDI-II scores, results revealed a 
significant main effect for time (Wilks’ Lambda = .71, F (1, 28) = 11.52, p = .002, ηp
2
 = 
.29), with both groups showing a significant reduction in BDI-II scores from pre to post 
(see Table 2; Figure 4). However, results did not reveal a significant interaction between 
group and time (Wilks’ Lambda = .89, F (1, 28) = 3.20, p = .08, ηp
2 
= .12). The main 
effect comparing the two training groups was not significant (F (1, 28) = .30, p = .59, ηp
2
 
= .011). The MADRS, a clinician-administered measure of depression, was also 
examined, and results again revealed a significant main effect for time (Wilks’ Lambda = 
.86, F (1, 28) = 4.6, p = .041, ηp
2 
= .14), but no significant interaction between group and 
time (Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F (1, 28) = .13, p = .72, ηp
2 
= .005). The main effect 
comparing the two training groups was not significant (F (1, 28) = .56, p = .46, ηp
2 
= .02), 
again suggesting no differences in the effectiveness of the two training conditions. 
Effect of intervention on attentional bias. A 2 (group: attention retraining vs. 
placebo control) x 2 (time: pre-intervention attention bias score, post-intervention 
attention bias score) mixed between-within ANOVA with repeated measures for time 
was conducted to examine the effects of the intervention on attention bias. Results 
revealed neither a significant main effect for time (Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F (1, 28) = 
.115, p = .737, ηp
2 = .004), nor a significant interaction between group and time (Wilks’ 
Lambda = .98, F (1, 28) = .55, p = .47, ηp
2 
= .02). The main effect comparing the two 
training groups was also not significant (F (1, 28) = .03, p = .86, ηp
2 
= .001). Therefore, 
the results of the study do not support Aim 1, Hypothesis 1 that at post-intervention, SAD 
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patients assigned to the active retraining condition would show greater reductions in 
attentional bias (as measured by reaction time) compared to SAD patients in the placebo 
control condition.  
There was, however, a significant correlation between change in attentional bias 
to social threat words and change in LSAS scores across groups (i.e., when all SAD 
patients were examined together). There was a strong, positive correlation between the 
two variables (r = .699, p < .0001), with greater changes in attentional bias associated 
with greater LSAS change. According to Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for interpretation, 
these results indicate a large correlation between change in LSAS score and change in 
attentional bias to social threat words.  
The correlation between SAD symptom change and attentional bias change was 
significant when each training group (i.e., active training group and placebo control 
group) was examined separately. For the active group, the correlation between change in 
attentional bias and change in LSAS was r =.501, p = .03, and for the placebo control 
group it was r = .767, p < .001.  
Correlations between change in attentional bias to the other stimulus words used 
(i.e., neutral words, physical threat words) and change in LSAS scores were examined to 
determine specificity of the result to socially relevant stimuli. Results indicated non-
significant correlations between attentional bias change to non-socially relevant stimuli 
and LSAS change  [(neutral words: r = -.207, p =.28); (physical threat words: r = -.141, p 
= .47)].  
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In light of a recent study reporting that attentional bias at pretreatment was 
predictive of treatment response (Amir, Taylor, & Donohue, 2011), standard multiple 
regression was used to assess the ability of certain independent variables (i.e., 
pretreatment attentional bias, pre LSAS score, group, change in attentional bias) to 
predict LSAS scores at post-treatment. The total variance in post-treatment LSAS scores 
explained by the model as a whole was 50.2%, F (4, 25) = 6.05, p = .002. Examining 
each independent variable’s contribution, pre LSAS scores made the strongest unique 
contribution to explaining post LSAS scores (beta coefficient = .88; p >.001), and 
uniquely explained 49% of the variance in post LSAS scores. Change in attentional bias 
also made a unique significant contribution (beta coefficient = -.49; p =.02), and 
explained 13% of the variance in post LSAS scores. Finally, neither group (i.e., active or 
placebo control; beta coefficient = -.025; p = .86),) nor pre-treatment attentional bias 
score (beta coefficient = .018, p = .91) made a statistically significant unique contribution 
to the equation. These findings suggest that LSAS severity at pre-treatment, as well as 
change in attentional bias, were predictive of SAD symptomatology at post-treatment.  
fMRI Results 
Sixteen healthy control subjects completed one fMRI scanning session to allow 
the direct comparison of brain activation in healthy controls to patients with SAD. The 
mean age of the healthy controls was 25.1 years (SD = 7.8). The majority of the sample 
was Caucasian (n=10), followed by Asian (n=5), and Black/African American (n=6), and 
half the sample was female. The healthy control group was intentionally matched closely 
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with the SAD group, and there were no between group differences between the SAD 
group and healthy control group at baseline.  
 Motion outliers and accuracy rates. The number of motion outliers was small 
for both the SAD patients [pre (M = 3.13; SD = 6.56); post (M = 1.84; SD = 3.55)] and 
the healthy controls (M = 1.83; SD = 1.85). The groups did not differ in number of 
outliers at baseline, t(46) = .77, p = .45. There were also no group differences in number 
of motion outliers between the SAD patients in the active group [pre (M = 2.48; SD = 
4.36); post (M = 1.87; SD = 3.36)] as compared to those in the placebo control group [pre 
(M = 3.77; SD = 8.31); post (M = 1.82; SD = 3.85)]. The training groups did not differ in 
number of outliers at baseline, t(30) = -.55, p = .59. 
Individual reaction times for errors (i.e., incorrect responses) were excluded from 
the analyses. Additionally, trials in which response latencies were less than 50 ms or 
greater than 1200 ms were considered outliers and excluded from the analyses. The 
number of inaccurate responses was small for both the SAD patients [pre (M = 9.05; SD 
= 11.38); post (M = 7.42; SD = 9.12)] and the Healthy Controls (M = 13.31; SD = 11.73). 
The groups did not differ in number of inaccurate responses, t(46) = -1.21, p = .23. 
fMRI attentional bias data. As noted above, attentional bias is inferred when 
responses to probes replacing an emotional stimulus (e.g., threat or happy face) in 
emotional-neutral pairs are faster than responses to probes replacing the neutral stimulus.  
Attentional bias towards threat was similar for both the SAD patients [pre (M = -6.61; SD 
= 17.94)] and the Healthy Controls (M = 4.10; SD = 17.42) at baseline. The groups did 
not differ in levels of threat vigilance at baseline, t(46) = -1.97, p = .06. This finding is 
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contrary to current study expectations in which initial threat vigilance (at baseline) was 
expected to be greater for the SAD group than the Healthy Control group. There were 
also no group differences in vigilance between the SAD patients in the active group [pre 
(M = -4.95; SD = 14.78); post (M = 6.73; SD = 12.46)] as compared to the SAD patients 
in the placebo control group [pre (M = -8.27; SD = 21.01); post (M = -0.90; SD = 14.33)]. 
These groups did not differ in threat vigilance at baseline, t(30) = -.52, p = .61, or at post-
treatment t(29) = 1.58, p = .13.  
Attentional bias towards happy faces was also examined using reaction time data. 
Attention towards happy faces was again similar for the SAD patients (M = 1.50; SD = 
11.51) and the Healthy Controls (M = 2.01; SD = 19.64) at baseline. The groups did not 
differ in levels of attention towards happy faces at baseline, t(46) = -.12, p = .90. There 
were also no group differences in attention to happy faces between the SAD patients in 
the active group [pre (M = 0.71; SD = 12.17); post (M = 8.09; SD = 15.15)] as compared 
to those in the placebo control group [pre (M = 2.29; SD = 11.16); post (M = 9.92; SD = 
11.23)]. These groups did not differ in attention to happy faces at baseline, t(30) = -.38, p 
= .71, or at post-treatment t(29) = -.38, p = .71.   
SAD group (at baseline) compared to Healthy Control group. Commensurate 
with findings from previous studies (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2009), it was 
hypothesized that SAD patients in the active training group would experience a greater 
decrease in SAD symptoms and attentional bias as a result of the intervention than the 
placebo control group. However, as stated above, this hypothesis was not supported in the 
current study. As a result of this unexpected finding, and the finding that for the entire 
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sample change in attentional bias was highly correlated with LSAS change scores and 
predicted treatment outcome, fMRI analyses were conducted including the entire SAD 
sample, rather than examining the training groups separately.  
 Analyses revealed significant differences in BOLD levels between the SAD 
patients and healthy controls at pre-treatment in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for the following experimental conditions: Happy Invalid 
> Happy Valid and Happy Invalid > Happy Cue Only. Only contrasts involving happy 
face stimuli (not angry face stimuli) showed these results. An independent-samples t-test 
was conducted to compare the beta values for the SAD group at pre-treatment and the 
healthy control group in this Region-of-Interest (ROI) showing significant between-group 
differences. There was a significant difference in scores for the SAD pre group (M = -.60, 
SD = .79) and the Healthy Control group (M = -.09, SD = .45); t(45) = -2.36, p = .02. The 
magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = -.51, 95% CIs [-.945, -
.074]) was large (eta squared = 0.11). This finding indicates hypo-activation in the OFC 
and ACC at pre-treatment for the SAD group as compared to the Healthy Control group 
(see Figure 5). 
SAD group (at post-treatment) compared to Healthy Control group. An 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the beta values in the OFC and 
ACC for the SAD group at post-treatment and the Healthy Control group. At post-
treatment, there was no longer a significant difference in scores between the SAD group 
(M = -.21, SD = .61) and the Healthy Control group (M = -.09, SD = .45); t(45) = -.68, p 
= .50). The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = -.119, 95% CIs 
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[-.469, .23] was small (eta squared = 0.01). Therefore, at post-intervention the SAD 
group beta values were no longer significantly different than the healthy control group, 
suggesting that levels of BOLD activation for the SAD group had normalized (see Figure 
6). A paired-samples t-test was conducted to evaluate the difference in beta values for the 
SAD sample from pre to post. There was a statistically significant increase in beta values 
from pre (M = -.60, SD = .80) to post (M = -.21, SD = .61); t(30) = -2.342, p = .03. The 
mean decrease in beta values was -.39 (95% CIs [-.73, -.05]). The eta squared statistic 
(.15) indicated a large effect size.  
The relationship between change in beta scores for the SAD group and change in 
LSAS was investigated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. There was 
a small non-significant correlation between the two variables, r = .158, N = 31, p = .397. 
The relationship between change in beta scores and change in attentional bias was also 
examined, and results again showed a non-significant correlation (r = .001, N = 29, p = 
.99).  
 SAD symptom change and brain activation. Analyses conducted on the whole 
brain level revealed that change in SAD symptomatology (as measured by LSAS change 
from pre to post treatment) was significantly correlated with activation in the precuneus 
at pre-treatment (mean LSAS = 12.58 (SD = 13.93); mean BOLD signal = -.114 (SD = 
.88); r = .555, p = .001, N = 31). Only contrasts including angry faces resulted in this 
correlation; the contrast with the highest correlation was Angry Invalid > Happy Invalid 
(see Figure 7). On the dot probe task, the Angry Invalid trials consisted of an 
angry/neutral face pair where the probe replaced the neutral face; the Happy Invalid trials 
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consisted of a happy/neutral face pair where the probe replaced the neutral face. Thus, the 
Angry Invalid > Happy Invalid condition examined where activation was greater in 
response to Angry Invalid trials as compared to Happy Invalid trials.  
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Discussion 
Principal Findings 
The present study sought to replicate and extend findings from previous studies 
suggesting that attention retraining reduces attentional bias and anxiety symptoms among 
patients diagnosed with SAD. Furthermore, the study was the first to examine neural 
activation in SAD patients before and after an attention retraining intervention. Analyses 
of the current study provided confirmation for some proposed hypotheses; however, they 
also yielded several unexpected findings.  
Contrary to study hypotheses, results indicated no difference between the active 
and placebo control groups in attentional bias or SAD symptomatology as a result of the 
attention retraining intervention. Change in attentional bias was significantly correlated 
with change in SAD symptomatology across the entire SAD sample (r = .699, p < .0001). 
Initial SAD severity (i.e., LSAS at pre-treatment) and change in attentional bias were 
predictive of post-intervention SAD severity (i.e., LSAS at post-treatment). Consistent 
with previous findings, neuroimaging results indicated a significant difference in brain 
activation in the OFC and ACC at pre-treatment between SAD patients and healthy 
controls; at post-treatment, this difference was no longer significant, suggesting that 
BOLD activations in the SAD group had normalized. Finally, results indicate that 
activation at pre-treatment in the PCC/precuneus, an area of the brain implicated in self-
referential processing, was significantly correlated with SAD symptom change across the 
entire sample.  
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Attention Retraining Intervention 
With regard to the attention retraining intervention, the results of the current study 
did not support the hypothesis that those individuals randomly assigned to the active 
retraining condition would exhibit greater reductions in attentional bias and SAD 
symptomatology compared to those randomly assigned to the placebo control condition. 
Both groups experienced a significant decrease in SAD symptoms, but no interaction was 
found between group and time. Results indicated, however, that change in attentional bias 
towards social threat words was highly and significantly correlated with change in social 
anxiety symptoms across the entire sample. This finding supports the theory that 
attentional biases towards social threat and SAD symptomatology are closely linked 
(Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Hofmann, 2007). Moreover, non-
significant correlations were found between changes in attentional bias to non-socially 
relevant stimuli (i.e., physical threat words, neutral words) and LSAS change, further 
supporting this theory.  
In light of the current study’s findings, it is important to note that across all 
clinical trials to-date examining attention retraining as a treatment for SAD, patients in 
the placebo control condition, as well as those in the active condition, have improved. For 
example, in the Schmidt et al. (2009) study, 11% of the patients in the placebo control 
condition no longer met diagnostic criteria for SAD (compared to 72% of patients in the 
active condition). Similarly, in the Amir et al. (2009) study, 14% of patients in the 
placebo control condition no longer met DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for SAD (compared 
to 50% of patients in the attention retraining group). 
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When the current study was first proposed, no studies examining attention 
retraining interventions for SAD populations had reported null findings (i.e., no effect of 
group on reduction in SAD symptoms). As mentioned above (see Introduction), four such 
studies reporting null findings have recently been published (i.e., Boettcher et al., 2012; 
Carlbring et al., 2012; Julian et al., 2012; Neubauer et al., 2013). The publication of these 
studies is important, particularly when considering that results of recent meta-analyses 
(Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010) examining the efficacy of attention retraining 
interventions on symptom change were inconclusive due to non-robust fail-safe N 
calculations. It is plausible that publication bias may have existed in the past, whereby 
only studies reporting significant results were accepted for publication, while those with 
null findings are kept in the “file-drawer”.  
Possible Explanations for Study Findings 
Given that the current study did not find hypothesized group differences (and 
recent studies have also reported null findings), the question must be raised as to why.  
Placebo response. It is plausible that factors unrelated to the training paradigm, 
such as a placebo response, may have played a role in the results of the current study. The 
term “placebo response” refers to the apparent improvement in the clinical condition of 
patients assigned to the placebo arm of a randomized controlled trial. The placebo 
response is a common phenomenon in research and medicine, and it has been widely 
accepted as influential in the treatment of multiple conditions, such as chronic pain, 
impaired motor functioning, as well as psychiatric conditions such as mood and anxiety 
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disorders (Shapiro & Shapiro, 1997; Walsh, Seidman, Sysko, & Gould, 2002; Wampold, 
Minami, Tierney, Baskin, & Bhati, 2005).  
When an active treatment condition and a placebo result in similarly high 
response rates, it is difficult to conclude that the active treatment is, in fact, not 
efficacious. This is particularly true within the field of anxiety disorder research where 
the placebo response rates for many disorders are high (e.g., Stein, Baldwin, Dolberg, 
Despiegel, & Bandelow, 2006). A review of 15 clinical trials showed that patients with 
SAD had a moderately large benefit from placebo (mean d = 0.46; Oosterbaan, van 
Balkom, Spinhoven, & van Dyck, 2001). Specifically, the percentage of responders for 
placebo conditions was 23.5% (SD = 7.9, range = 8 - 33%), as compared to 53.5% (SD = 
19.2, range = 18 – 78%) for the active drug conditions. More recently, Huppert and 
colleagues examined the placebo response for SAD patients compared to patients with 
panic disorder (PD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Huppert et al., 2004). 
This study examined the effects of placebo across three randomized controlled trials 
comparing cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), medication, and their combination (i.e., 
CBT + medication) to placebo. Results showed that patients with SAD and PD showed 
significantly larger placebo responses than patients with OCD. The relatively high 
placebo response rate for SAD is important to consider when interpreting the results of 
the current study. It is possible that in the current study, there was simply a high placebo 
response rate, such that the patients in the placebo condition improved similarly to those 
in the active retraining condition.  
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It has been proposed that placebo effects may act on a number of mechanisms 
including anxiety reduction, conditioning, social support, increased sense of mastery and 
control, increased self-efficacy, and expectancy. The role of expectancy is thought to play 
a major role in the placebo response among anxiety disorders. The “expectancy theory” 
posits that the placebo response is related to patients’ expectations of improvement 
(Gladstein, 1969; Kirsch, 1990). Patient expectancy is defined as a patient’s beliefs about 
how a given treatment will affect them and may influence outcomes. Expectancy may 
also bring about increased self-esteem and improved coping. Expectancy effects have 
been studied widely in psychiatry and the social sciences, and it is believed that 
expectations may help account for the placebo effects seen in many randomized clinical 
trials across many disorders (Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). For example, expectancy 
effects have been linked to greater improvement of symptoms in trials examining 
depression (e.g., Krell, Leuchter, Morgan, Cook, & Abrams, 2004; Meyer et al., 2002; 
Rutherford, Wager, & Roose, 2010), and other clinical problems, such as irritable bowel 
syndrome (e.g., Kaptchuk et al., 2009).  
A major advantage of attention retraining interventions is the maintenance of a 
valid blind (i.e., the placebo control condition appears identical in all aspects to the active 
condition aside from the contingency created between probe positions). Indeed, patients 
and researchers are typically completely unaware of which condition the patient is 
assigned, thereby greatly reducing interference from demand characteristics and 
expectancy effects.  However, despite this advantage, expectancy of therapeutic gain may 
still play a role in symptom improvement. In the current study, all participants were told 
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that the study was examining the effects of a novel “treatment” on symptoms of social 
anxiety. They were told that they had a 50% chance of being randomly assigned to the 
active condition or the placebo control condition, Moreover, they were told that previous 
research studies had shown the active condition to be effective in mitigating symptoms of 
social anxiety, although given individual differences it was unknown how they would 
respond if assigned to the active condition. This knowledge alone may have created an 
expectancy of change, thereby leading some patients in the placebo control group to 
report symptom reductions. 
Control (placebo) condition serves as a weak intervention. Another possible 
explanation for the fact that there were no group differences in the current study lies with 
the placebo control condition. The placebo control condition of the dot probe task pairs 
probes with neutral and threatening stimuli with equal frequency. There is no 
contingency between probes and stimulus type; therefore, no training is thought to occur. 
However, the placebo condition assumes that the participant has a neutral bias (i.e., no 
bias towards or away from threat), and that this bias will therefore remain unchanged 
because no training occurs. However, if a participant has a bias towards threat, the 
placebo may potentially serve as a weak intervention. In essence, in the placebo control 
condition, the 50% of the trials where the probe replaces the neutral face could be seen as 
training trials, while the other 50% where probes replace the threatening face would not. 
Although one would still assume that the participants receiving the active training would 
improve more than those in the placebo control condition, it is plausible that the patients 
assigned to the placebo condition might also improve as a result of receiving this 
  
54 
“watered down” intervention. This may explain why in the current study and in previous 
published studies, participants in both the active and placebo groups improved (e.g., 
Schmidt et al., 2009; Amir et al., 2009). Perhaps the placebo control condition was a less 
robust intervention than the active intervention, but an intervention nonetheless.  
Placebo control condition = exposure to threatening faces. Another potential 
explanation for the current study findings is that patients in the placebo control group 
may have experienced symptom improvement simply from exposure to threatening faces. 
Symptom reductions may reflect desensitization to repeatedly presented threat stimuli. 
Unfortunately there is no way to test this hypothesis within the current study. One way 
around this potential problem in future studies would be to employ control conditions 
with neutral-neutral face pairs as have been used in recent studies (Eldar et al., 2012); 
therefore, not exposing patients in the placebo control group to threatening faces.   
Intervention provided social contact/exposure. It is also plausible that the 
frequent study visits (i.e., twice per week) provided more occasions for social interactions 
than many of the patients would have experienced normally. Participants in the current 
study completed two fMRI scanning sessions and eight training sessions for a total of 10 
study visits. Each of these study visits could be seen as an exposure in which patients 
faced their fears and interacted with others.  Furthermore, the frequent study sessions 
could have served as behavioral activation.  
Aspects of Attention Retraining Paradigms (technical parameters)   
The impressive results in symptom reductions seen in some attention retraining 
intervention studies and the null findings seen in others beg the question of what are the 
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most effective parameters for attention retraining intervention protocols, and can 
differences in these parameters account for differences in outcome. Recent meta-analyses 
(Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010) indicate that studies that employ words (rather 
than pictures) and present stimuli in a top/bottom (rather than left/right) orientation 
resulted in the greatest therapeutic change (in the current study, pictures where presented 
in a top/down orientation). Additionally, it appears that the greater the number of training 
sessions, the greater the effect size. Differences in parameters across studies may account 
for some discrepancies in outcome; however, they cannot explain why studies employing 
the exact same stimuli and presentation parameters have found very different results. For 
example, the training intervention used in the current study was identical to that used by 
Amir and colleagues (2009), but failed to replicate the findings of that study. The 
explanation for differences in outcome between these studies remains unknown.  
Given that SAD patients appear to vary in their response to attention retraining 
interventions, a recent study attempted to illuminate what demographic, clinical, and 
cognitive disturbance characteristics (e.g., attentional bias) predict treatment response 
(Amir et al., 2011). This study consisted of 112 patients with SAD, randomized to the 
active retraining condition (n = 55) or the placebo control condition (n = 57). Results 
indicated that ethnicity predicted response across both groups, with patients identifying as 
non-Caucasian displaying better treatment response, as measured by change in LSAS 
scores, than those identifying as Caucasian (t(96) = 4.20, p < .001, 2.86  0.68). 
Additionally, results showed that level of attentional bias at pretreatment was predictive 
of treatment response (i.e., LSAS change), with greater attentional bias at baseline 
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predicting greater treatment response (t(90) = -3.06, p = .003, -0.07  0.02). Results 
showed no other variables as predictive of treatment outcome. Overall, these results 
suggest that there may exist a subset of patients for which attention retraining 
interventions may be most beneficial. In the current study, the N was too small to 
examine ethnicity, but other potential predictors were examined. Current study findings 
showed that level of attentional bias at baseline did not predict treatment response (i.e., 
LSAS change); however, pre-treatment LSAS score, as well as change in attentional bias, 
were predictive of treatment response. 
Neural Activation 
Differences between SAD group and Healthy Control group at pre and post 
treatment. Results of the current study revealed significant group differences at pre-
treatment between the SAD patients and Healthy Controls in the OFC and ACC. As 
noted earlier (see Introduction), the PFC plays a crucial role in threat detection and is 
thought to modulate initial vigilance signals generated by the amygdala. In the current 
study, the SAD patients show less activation in the OFC and ACC compared to the 
Healthy Controls at pre-treatment, suggesting that the SAD patients may not be engaging 
higher level cortical regions as readily as the Healthy Controls.  This finding is consistent 
with other fMRI studies in anxious populations showing such deficiencies (Monk et al., 
2006; Monk et al., 2008; Price et al., 2011).  
 Results of the current study revealed that at post-treatment there were no longer 
significant differences in BOLD activations in the OFC and ACC between the SAD 
group and the Healthy Control group. This finding suggests that at post-treatment, the 
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levels of activation in the SAD group had normalized and that the SAD group was more 
readily able to recruit higher order cognitive processes/regions. However, neither change 
in LSAS nor change in attentional bias was correlated with change in activation in this 
ROI for the SAD group.  
The differences in activation in the OFC and ACC seen between the SAD patients 
and healthy controls were observed only during experimental conditions of the dot probe 
task that involved happy face stimuli (i.e., Happy Invalid > Happy Valid; Happy Invalid 
> Happy Cue Only). This finding is contrary to study hypotheses that predicted more 
pronounced group differences during trials involving angry face stimuli (conveying 
disapproval and likely evoking a fear response and negative cognitions) as compared to 
happy or neutral face stimuli. Past fMRI studies in SAD samples have shown that stimuli 
of different emotional valences (e.g., happy, angry) elicit greater neural responses in SAD 
patients as compared to Healthy Controls (e.g., Straube et a., 2005). It is possible that 
SAD patients may process positive stimuli (i.e., happy faces) as safety signals. Or 
perhaps they may process them as construing ridicule or as an invitation for later 
rejection. SAD is characterized by a fear of embarrassment, and both criticism and praise 
have been shown to result in embarrassment. Campbell and colleagues (2009) conducted 
a study in which SAD patients rated happy faces as less approachable than Healthy 
Controls. Results also indicated that among the SAD group, symptom severity was 
negatively correlated with rated approachability. The SAD patients included in the 
current study had generalized SAD at a severe level (LSAS  60), and it is possible that 
happy faces may have been construed as negative or threatening. Unfortunately, this 
  
58 
cannot be tested as information regarding approachability and likeability of the face 
stimuli was not obtained.  
There were no differences in amygdala activation between the SAD group and the 
Healthy Control group in the current study as hypothesized. Other neuroimaging studies 
have found similar results, with pronounced differences in PFC activity between anxious 
populations and Healthy Controls without accompanying differences in amygdalar 
activity (e.g., Monk et al., 2006). Although differences in amygdala activation between 
the SAD patient group and healthy control group were frequently reported in early 
neuroimaging studies of SAD populations, it has become increasingly common in recent 
years that studies do not find such differences (e.g., Doehrmann et al., 2013; Goldin, 
Manber-Ball, Werner, Heimberg, & Gross, 2009). A recent study by Ziv and colleagues 
(2013) highlights the fact that abnormalities in amygdala response (and the limbic system 
more generally) among patients with SAD may not define the disorder as originally 
thought. In this study, 67 SAD patients and 28 matched healthy controls participated in 
fMRI tasks in which they viewed harsh faces, social criticism (delivered by actors via 
videotape), and negative self-beliefs. Results indicated no differences in levels of 
activation between the SAD group and the Healthy Control group in the amygdala or 
insula. Additionally, despite no differences in neural response, the SAD group reported 
heightened negative emotion as compared to the control group. The authors concluded 
that this difference in emotional response between the two groups was likely driven by 
dysfunction in higher cognitive processes. The results from this study are consistent with 
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the current study’s findings of dysfunctional activity in the PFC with no accompanying 
abnormalities in limbic activity.  
One methodological reason behind the current study’s amygdala findings may 
pertain to the design of the fMRI dot probe paradigm used. Most studies that found 
differences in amygdala activation between SAD populations and healthy controls 
employed fMRI paradigms in block designs (e.g., Phan et al., 2006; Shah et al., 2008). 
Block designs present stimuli in sets; for example, a series of 10 fearful faces will be 
presented in succession, following by the a series of 10 neutral faces presented in 
succession. Since BOLD has delayed temporal resolution, block designs increase power 
and are thought to be more sensitive to the detection of functional activation compared to 
event-related designs, which present stimuli in random/varied order (Liu & Frank, 2004). 
The current study employed an event-related design because a block design was not 
appropriate given the nature of the dot-probe task. It is important to note, however, that 
some studies showing no differences in amygdala activation between SAD patients and 
healthy controls have used block designs. Furthermore, in the Freitas-Ferrari et al. (2010) 
meta-analysis, results showed that studies employing event-related designs showed 
similar areas and patterns of activation as those employing block designs. Therefore, 
although possible, it is unlikely that the design used in the current study could fully 
explain the fact that no between-group differences in amygdala activation were found.  
Brain Activation and SAD Symptom Change. The finding that BOLD 
activation in the precuneus and PCC at pre-treatment was significantly correlated with 
LSAS symptom change scores was not expected in the current study, but is consistent 
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with previous work suggesting that these brain regions may play a role in SAD 
pathophysiology (e.g., Gentili, 2009; Goldin, Ziv, Jazaiere, & Gross, 2012; Pannekoek et 
al., 2013; Warwick, 2008). The precuneus is a brain region located in the posterior region 
of the medial parietal cortex and is thought to be involved in higher order cognitive 
functions such as self-processing, experience of agency, first-person perspective taking, 
episodic memory retrieval, and visuo-spatial imagery (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Given 
that SAD is characterized by excessive self-scrutiny, self-consciousness, and fear of 
negative judgments by others, it is not surprising that aberrant BOLD signals in this brain 
area have appeared in other fMRI studies of SAD populations and were positively 
correlated with symptom change in the current study. Only fMRI contrasts in the current 
study involving the presentation of angry faces resulted in a significant correlation of 
symptom change (i.e., LSAS change) with precuneus activation at pre-treatment. This is 
consistent with study expectations that angry face stimuli would result in higher levels of 
BOLD activation for the SAD patients as compared to healthy controls.  
Numerous neuroimaging studies of SAD patients have shown BOLD activation in 
the precuneus in response to self-referential verbal stimuli (Blair et al., 2008), and faces 
versus nonsense pictures (Gentili et al., 2009).  More recently, treatment studies in SAD 
samples have shown that BOLD signal levels in the precuneus decrease following 
treatment. For example, a recent study examining the effect of mindfulness-based stress 
reduction on patients with SAD showed a decrease in precuneus activation during a self-
referential encoding task from pre- to post-treatment (Goldin et al., 2012). Precuneus 
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deactivation has also been shown in SAD patients following a course of paroxetine 
treatment (Schneier, Pomplun, Sy, & Hirsch, 2011).  
It is important to note that in the current study, the correlation between pre-
treatment LSAS scores and symptom change (as measured by LSAS change scores; r = 
.593, p > .001, N = 31) was slightly greater than the correlation between activation in the 
precuneus and symptom change (r = .555, p = .001, N = 31). Although using neural 
activation as a treatment prediction tool may be useful in the future, it is premature based 
of the results of the current study to conclude that levels of activation in precuneus should 
be used in this way.  
Current Study Limitations 
Ideally, the current study would have included a waitlist control condition. The 
effects of time alone on attentional bias and symptom change are unknown in the current 
study. By employing a waitlist control group, it would have been possible to see whether 
the active and placebo control groups outperformed the waitlist control condition in terms 
of symptom reduction and thereby prove that time alone was not a contributing factor. It 
also would also have been interesting to include a non-socially anxious clinical 
comparison group (e.g., patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder) in order to help 
clarify disorder specificity. Unlike other fMRI studies that excluded SAD patients with 
comorbidities (e.g., Shah et al., 2009; Phan et al., 2006), the current study included such 
patients as long as they had a primary diagnosis of generalized SAD. Unfortunately, 
resource limitations precluded the use of a waitlist control group or clinical control group 
for the purposes of this study.  
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The current study included a small number of participants with SAD. This small 
sample size of participants in the active (n = 16) and control (n = 16) conditions may 
have contributed to the failure to find between group differences in the attention 
retraining intervention. The sample size for the current study was chosen based upon 
power curves generated by Desmond and Glover (2002), estimating minimal sample size 
for fMRI studies. With percent signal changes at approximately 0.05% and spatial 
smoothing at full-width half-maximum of 5mm, it is recommended that a minimum of 12 
subjects be included to ensure 80% power at a  = 0.05 level. This sample size was also 
deemed appropriate to account for occasional malfunctioning of fMRI recording systems, 
and noisy or unreliable data. Therefore, the sample size was chosen specifically for the 
fMRI portion of the study and not to optimize power for the attention retraining 
intervention. It is important to note, however, that all recent studies reporting null 
findings (Boettcher et al., 2012; Carlbring et al, 2012; Julian et al., 2012; Neubauer et al., 
2013) included large samples (N = 68, 79, 112, and 56, respectively). Therefore, it is 
possible, but unlikely, that with a larger sample the between group attention retraining 
results of the current study would have changed.  
Finally, as mentioned earlier, a methodological limitation is the lack of formal 
assessment of expectancy of change. Ideally, the current study would have measured this 
at the outset of the study, as it is possible that the patients who anticipated improving the 
most were the ones who showed the greatest symptom reductions. To better tease apart 
the role of expectancy effects in attention retraining interventions, future studies could 
assess and manipulate expectancy effects. This could be achieved by varying the 
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instructions across patients; for example, half the sample might be told they may receive 
a treatment for SAD (as in the current study), while the other half might be told they may 
receive an intervention completely unrelated to SAD (e.g., to increase visual acuity). 
Future Directions 
 The current study proposed that a computerized attention retraining intervention 
would result in reduced attentional bias and SAD symptomatology among patients 
diagnosed with generalized SAD. The lack of support for the beneficial role of attention 
retraining in this study warrants further investigation. Future studies employing larger 
samples of SAD patients and multiple training sessions are needed. Future research 
should consider what aspects of the stimuli and their presentation have been shown to 
lead to the greatest change (e.g., words vs. pictures), and employ what has been shown to 
be most efficacious. Studies directly examining and comparing specific parameters also 
need to be conducted, as do studies examining the effects of various types of placebo 
control conditions. For example, in addition to examining control conditions with neutral-
neutral face pairs, studies should examine the effects of geometric shapes and other 
inanimate objects (Eldar et al., 2012). 
Given the results of the current study, that changes in attentional bias are highly 
and significantly correlated with reductions in SAD symptoms, it is important to further 
explore this relationship. One way to achieve this would be to examine the influence of 
empirically supported treatments for SAD (e.g., CBT) on changes in attentional bias by 
measuring attentional bias pre- and post-intervention. Attention to threat is an explicit 
target of CBT, as cognitive biases are directly challenged through cognitive restructuring 
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and the implementation of in vivo exposures. Therefore, it would be interesting to 
examine whether patients who respond to CBT also experience a decrease in attentional 
bias towards social threat. Also, if future studies show that attention retraining is indeed 
an efficacious treatment for SAD, it may offer an additional tool to augment CBT 
treatments. Although some studies have already examined the effect of adding attention 
retraining to CBT and did not show added benefit (e.g., McEvoy & Perini, 2009), more 
research is necessary. 
Attentional bias interventions have many advantages over conventional 
psychotherapeutic approaches, as they are easy to administer, cost-effective, and 
minimize patient burden (e.g., side effects, negative emotional experiences). Also, given 
their administration over the computer and Internet, they have the potential for wide-
reaching and rapid dissemination. However, despite these advantages, it appears 
premature to employ attention retraining as a standard treatment. The current study 
contributes to the evidence base for attention retraining as a novel treatment for SAD and 
highlights the necessity of replication studies. Future studies are necessary to establish a 
firm empirical basis for the efficacy of attention retraining in SAD populations. 
More research is also necessary investigating the neurobiology of SAD. Research 
to date has led to a deeper understanding of the disorder, and in the future neuroimaging 
will hopefully lead to more effective treatments. Ideally, in the future fMRI imaging may 
show neuromarkers for treatment response in SAD as well as aid in choosing the most 
effective treatment (e.g., CBT, psychotropic medication) given certain neural disruptions. 
More research is needed, however, before patients exhibiting certain patterns of neural 
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activation can be matched to specific interventions in an individualized medicine 
approach.  
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Table 1. SAD Participant Demographic and Clinical Characteristics at Baseline. 
 
Characteristic Overall Sample Active Retraining Group Placebo Control Group 
Gender (M/F) 17/15 8/8 9/7 
N 32 16 16 
Age 26.7 (9.6) [range 18-59] 26.9 (9.8) 26.8 (10.4) 
Age of onset 12.4 (4.6) 11.7 (5.1) 13.1 (4.0) 
Patients with comorbid 
anxiety disorder 
9 5 4 
Patients with comorbid mood 
disorder 
8 5 3 
Patients taking psychotropic 
medication 
8 5 3 
Anxiety Measures:    
          LSAS total 76.25 (16.24) 73.38 (14.02) 79.13 (18.19) 
          SPIN 43.31 (8.52) 44.63 (8.32) 42.0 (8.79) 
          STAI – T 53.75 (10.19) 54.63 (8.67) 52.87 (11.73) 
          STAI – S 46.41 (12.68) 45.94 (14.74) 46.87 (10.71) 
Depression Measures:    
          BDI-II 15.25 (11.33) 17.0 (12.19) 13.50 (10.49) 
          MADRS 6.31 (5.08) 6.63 (5.33) 6.00 (4.98) 
Qualilty of life measure:    
          LIFE-RIFT 9.87 (1.48) 10.06 (1.48) 9.69 (1.49) 
          ACQ 31.50 (10.32) 30.69 (10.03) 32.31 (10.87) 
          ASQ 54.03 (11.61) 54.69 (12.57) 53.38 (10.94) 
Table shows means (standard deviations). 
 
Note. ACQ = Anxiety Control Questionnaire (Rapee, Craske, Brown, & Barlow, 1996); ASQ = Affective Style  
Questionnaire (Hofmann & Kashdan, 2010); BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996);  
LIFE-RIFT = Range of Impaired Functioning Tool (Leon et al., 1999); LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale  
(Liebowitz, 1987); MADRS = Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (Montgomery & Asberg, 1979); SPIN =  
Social Phobia Inventory (Connor et al., 2000); STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, state version (Spielberger, 1983); 
STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait version (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Social Anxiety and Depression Measures at Pre and 
Post Intervention.  
 
Measure Active Training Group (n = 15) Placebo Control Group (n = 16) 
Pre-assessment Post-assessment Pre-assessment Post-assessment 
Social Anxiety 
Measures 
        
          LSAS 72.80 (14.32)  61.87 (13.54)  78.13 (18.38)  62.80 (11.92)  
          SPIN 41.87 (9.08)  38.2 (7.18)  44.33 (8.52)  39.47 (7.41)  
Depression 
Measures 
        
          BDI-II 15.80 (11.60)  10.27 (10.15)  12.00 (8.91)  10.33 (8.02)  
  MADRS 6.47 (5.48)  4.87 (4.72)  5.13 (3.70)  4.00 (3.317)  
Table shows means (standard deviations).  
 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996); LSAS = Liebowitz  
Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); MADRS = Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale  
(Montgomery & Asberg, 1979); SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory (Connor et al., 2000).
6
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Figure 1. Attention Retraining Task. Figure depicts a Valid Threat trial (i.e., the probe 
replaces the disgust face).  
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Figure 2. Modified Dot Probe Task. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Group Changes in LSAS Scores Across Training Sessions. 
Standard Errors are shown. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of Group Changes in BDI-II Scores Across Training Sessions. 
Standard Errors are shown. 
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Figure 5.  Cortical representation of hypo-activation in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) at pre-treatment for the SAD group compared to the 
Healthy Control group. Happy Invalid > Happy Valid contrast is depicted. 
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Figure 6. Change in activation in the OFC/ACC from pre- to post-treatment for the SAD 
group compared to the Healthy Control group. At pre-intervention, SAD patients showed 
significantly less activation in the OFC/ACC compared to healthy controls. At post-
intervention, the SAD group beta values were no longer significantly different than the 
healthy control group. The Y-axis shows level of brain activation in beta values. Standard 
Errors are shown.  
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Figure 7.  Cortical representation of areas of activation in the posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC) and precuneus at pre-treatment that were significantly correlated with LSAS 
change scores. Only contrasts including angry faces resulted in this correlation.  
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